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Abstract
The paper explores the relationships and interconnections in the philosophical and socio-
political concepts of Günther Anders and Hannah Arendt. Both philosophers, who were
married to each other for a short time, not only shared a similar fate in that they both had
to flee from National Socialism, but both dealt with similar questions, albeit in different man-
ners: with Auschwitz and the Holocaust, with the problem of totalitarianism, with the
development of the Modern, which is defined by technology and industrial labour. A com-
parison shows that many themes in the thinking of these philosophers are near to each
other, but the methods and foci are other. At the foreground of Anders’ thinking is the
question of the destructive influence of modern technology and weapons of mass destruc-
tion. However, Arendt concentrates on totalitarian political structures and the possibility
of people to take action. Nevertheless, they both are concerned that people’s humanity is
at risk under the political and technological conditions of the Modern.
Keywords: Philosophy of the 20th century; Anders; Arendt; Heidegger; Auschwitz; Holo-
caust; Hiroshima; political philosophy; philosophy of technology; media philosophy; ethics;
mass destruction; National Socialism; labour.
Resumen. Reflexión después de Auschwitz e Hiroshima: Günther Anders y Hannah Arendt
Este artículo explora las relaciones e interconexiones en los conceptos filosóficos y socio-polí-
ticos de Günther Anders y Hannah Arendt. Ambos filósofos, que estuvieron casados duran-
te un breve tiempo, no sólo compartieron un destino similar, puesto que ambos tuvieron
que huir del nacionalsocialismo, sino que también se ocuparon de cuestiones similares, si
bien de distintas maneras: trataron de Auschwitz y el Holocausto, del problema del tota-
litarismo, del desarrollo de la modernidad, el cual es definido por la tecnología y el traba-
jo industrial. Esta comparación muestra que muchos de los temas del pensamiento de estos
filósofos son afines, aunque los métodos y enfoques difieren. En el primer plano del pen-
samiento de Anders está la cuestión de la influencia destructiva de la tecnología moderna
y de las armas de destrucción masiva. Por otro lado, Arendt se centra en estructuras polí-
ticas totalitarias y la posibilidad de intervención de las personas. Sin embargo, ambos están
preocupados por el hecho de que la humanidad de las personas está en riesgo bajo las con-
diciones políticas y tecnológicas de la modernidad.
Palabras clave: filosofía del siglo XX; Anders; Arendt; Heidegger; Auschwitz; Holocausto;
Hiroshima; filosofía política; filosofía de la tecnología; filosofía de los medios; ética; des-
trucción masiva; nacionalsocialismo; trabajo.
1. Translation from German: Andrew Smith.
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In retrospect, many people regard the 20th century as one of the most violent
epochs in the history of mankind. To question how and whether it is still pos-
sible to philosophize in view of Auschwitz, Hiroshima and Gulag is to question
the possibilities and limits of philosophy itself. It means asking what it can
mean to understand this century of barbarism philosophically, and it means
asking whether thought as thought can still make sense at all under these cir-
cumstances, and in view of a development of technology and civilization far sur-
passing all man’s previous forms of self-empowerment. Using the example of
a philosopher couple, this essay sets out to at least intimate what it can mean
to face up to these problems. It may be pure chance that the paths of the two
philosophers who examined these questions more radically than virtually any-
thing else crossed in a remarkable manner: Günther Anders (1902-1992) and
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). The thought of both is inseparably linked to
the political disasters and violent events which they both experienced during
their lives. As dissimilar as they were, the couple was bound not only by their
brief marriage, but also by the conviction that, if philosophy were still to have
any meaning, it had to leave the academic forum so as to deal with urgent and
persistent problems of the present and the immediate past as soon as the lat-
ter threatened to burst the accepted forms of comprehension.
Günther Anders (whose real name was Stern) was born in Breslau in 1902.
His father was William Stern, the well-known psychologist. Günther Anders
grew up in a middle-class, well assimilated Jewish family. As a boy his main
interests were literature, music and painting. After the First World War, Anders
studied philosophy and art history under Cassirer and Panofsky, and later phi-
losophy in Freiburg under Husserl and Heidegger. He graduated under Husserl
in 1923, and in 1925 met Hannah Arendt in Husserl’s Freiburg discussion
group. He met her again in Berlin four years later, and soon afterwards married
her. Anders’ attempt to become habilitated in the philosophy of music in
Frankfurt floundered, not least due to the resistance of Theodor W. Adorno.
From 1930-1932 Anders worked on an anti-fascist novel The Molussic Cata-
comb, which could no longer be published. The work was first published only
in 1992, sixty years after it was written. In 1933 Anders and his wife emigrated
to Paris, where Anders wrote political poems. Under the title Pathologie de la
Liberté he published his negative anthropology, the outlines of which he had
sketched out at the end of the 1920s. This work was to have a significant
impact on Jean-Paul Sartre.
Anders and Hannah Arendt were divorced in 1936. Anders fled to Amer-
ica, but maintained contact with Brecht, Marcuse, Thomas Mann and Adorno.
Anders always remained an outsider whilst in exile. He was neither as cele-
brated nor as financially secure as many of his colleagues, some of whom were
extremely condescending towards this headstrong poet and philosopher. How-
ever, the experience which Anders gained in America, and in particular the
various jobs with which he was obliged to earn a living sharpened his eye for
the factors that are of central importance to modern civilization. His some-
what ludicrous job as a cleaner in the props rooms of Hollywood induced him
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to make the historico-philosophical and epistemological reflections without
which his subsequent media theory, for example, would scarcely have been
possible.
Günther Anders’ life and thought took a decisive turn as the truth about
the Nazis’ extermination policy slowly seeped through, followed especially by the
news of the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. This horrific
event, the true dimensions of which only gradually became apparent, marked
the beginning of a global threat to mankind. From this moment on, it also
had a considerable influence on Anders’ life. Although he returned to Europe
in 1950, it was not to either of the two Germanies, but to Vienna, the home
of his second wife, Elisabeth Freundlich, whom he met in New York. There
he turned down the opportunity to make a career as a literary essayist, which
would have been possible following the success of a book about Kafka, and
an academic appointment. As a freelance journalist, the theme to which he
devoted the following decades of his life was the possibility of exterminating
mankind due to the construction of the atomic bomb. In 1959, Anders entered
into a correspondence with Hiroshima pilot Claude Eatherly. This corre-
spondence was published by Robert Jungk in 1961 under the title Burning
Conscience. However, the concept of a self-induced apocalypse also runs through
Günther Anders’ main, two-volume philosophical work, The Antiquity of Man.
However, he was concerned about far more than this: about a radical philos-
ophy of industrial civilization that appears to reach its ultimate extremity in
the bomb. He also published his reflections on space travel, philosophical
stenographs, diaries, glossaries and even literary works. Anders died at an
advanced age and still working in Vienna in 1992.
Anders first attracted attention in the 1950s with a study of television that
firstly represented a milestone in the development of media theory: The World
as a Phantom and a Matrix. Anders poses the question as to what the picture
provided by a television set actually represents in the dual meaning of the word:
«The peculiarity of the situation created by the broadcast (consists) of its onto-
logical ambiguities». Ontological ambiguity: in other words, the television pic-
ture cannot be assigned to any of the realms in which we are accustomed to
think: virtuality or reality, likeness or actuality. A broadcast event —and the
principle of live broadcasting is a paradigm in this analysis— cannot be described
either as pure imagery, and certainly not as the as-if reality of a work of art.
In other words, it is not a form of aesthetic virtuality, but neither is it reality,
as if the event itself were taking place in the living room. The broadcast events
are «at one and the same time present and absent, at once real and virtual, at
once there and not there». They are —to use the term with which Anders
described the quintessence of television— «phantoms»2. These images, how-
ever, have an absolute archetypal role: they become the matrix, or template,
by which people are imprinted. In this manner, produced for television or live,
2. Anders, Günther (1980). Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, Bd. I. München: Beck, p. 131.
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they again become a phantom. It is as such that television pictures, acting as a
matrix for human behavior, generate the world which they then portray. The
lie has lied itself true, and reality forms itself based on the images of this lie.
The relationship between man and technology played a decisive role in the
philosophy of Günther Anders. One of the central premises of this philoso-
phy states: the products of our technical intelligence are more than they appear.
It is from this that Anders derived his controversial thesis of the Promethean
gradient, of an inescapable difference between man and technology:
So this is the basic dilemma of our age: we are smaller than ourselves. In other
words, we are incapable of creating an image of something that we ourselves
have made. To this extent we are inverted Utopians: whereas Utopians are
unable to make the things they imagine, we are unable to imagine the things
we make.3
The perfectibility of technical equipment increasingly exceeds the cognitive
and emotional potential of man. In his immediate dealings with perfect
machines, man reacts with a Promethean shame, to use Anders’ disputed ter-
minology. Man is obliged to admit his own imperfection in view of the per-
fection of technology.
Certainly, long before there was any talk of networked systems, Anders already
knew that it was inadmissible to reduce the problem to the relationship between
an individual and a single appliance.
If there were a sociology of things, its axiom would be: there is no such thing
as a single appliance. On the contrary, every one is a zoon politikon; outside
its society it is a mere Robinson thing that would remain unserviceable.
In this context the word society is not used to designate only equals, not only
the millions of appliances functioning simultaneously or their sum total, but
a correlate accommodating morphologically to the appliance, a housing con-
sisting of raw materials, consumers, sibling appliances, waste disposal systems
that embed, nourish, and purify it —in short: an environment.4
In the developed industrial nations, at least, this aspect of the networked
momentum of these appliances becomes the determining, driving and struc-
turing aspect of their development. According to Anders, it is precisely in this
sense as a society that technology itself becomes a new theme of history: the
themes of freedom and unfreedom replace one another. Things are free, man
is unfree. Man has to subordinate himself to the needs of technology. Where
this does not occur, we logically refer to human failure. In view of technolo-
gy, in the end man fails when he behaves in an intrinsically human manner.
An example is the driver of a locomotive whose concentration fails him because
of his emotional problems, thereby causing an accident. If time and activity
3. Anders, Günther (1981). Die atomare Drohung. Radikale Überlegungen, München: Beck,
p. 96.
4. Anders. Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, p. 115.
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structures are determined by machines, the times when the worried lover or
griever could expect to be treated leniently are a thing of the past. Anders sum-
marizes the fundamentals of the relationship between man and technical appli-
ance in his essay The Term:
Our aim is always to create something that could dispense with our assistance
and function perfectly without us. In other words, nothing less than appli-
ances through whose functioning we make ourselves superfluous, eliminate
ourselves, liquidate ourselves. It is of no consequence that we only ever approx-
imately achieve this goal. What counts is this trend and its maxim, which is:
«without us!».5
What this means to Anders, though, is that in an industrial civilization
unhuman tasks increasingly become tasks without humans. The dropping of
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima became a paradigm of this to Anders: at the
touch of a button, hundreds of thousands of people were killed in just a few sec-
onds. However, Anders saw the initial attempts to achieve such a mechaniza-
tion of death in the National Socialists’ extermination machinery. He regard-
ed this not as singular barbarism, but as a specific expression of the civilizational
development of the modern age. For this reason he was one of the few who
considered Auschwitz and Hiroshima —for all their differences— within a
single context. Günther Anders even wrote an open letter to Klaus Eichmann,
Adolf Eichmann’s son, published under the significant title of We, Eichmann’s
Sons. In this letter he examined the connections between technical modernism,
Auschwitz and Hiroshima in an exceptionally original manner. In both places,
something dreadful happened which Anders described as monstrous, a term of
central import to him.
To Anders the monstrous thing at Auschwitz was the «institutional and
industrialized extermination of millions of people». It was only possible to
carry this out because the process of mass extermination was organized by peo-
ple «who undertook this work like any other»6. Anders formulated this in preg-
nant terms in The Antiquity of Man: «Those employed in the extermination
camps did not act, but, as terrible as it may sound, they worked»7.
Nevertheless, Anders was unable to overlook the differences between
Auschwitz and Hiroshima. He considered Auschwitz to have been «morally
incomparably more terrible» than Hiroshima —whilst the latter was «incom-
parably worse» than the former. This was because, at Auschwitz, despite all the
mechanization of the killing process, there was still direct involvement of indi-
viduals, with all their sadism, cruelty, hatred, and cynicism towards their vic-
tims, brutality, careerism, and perhaps even doubts. There was still close phys-
ical contact between perpetrators and victims. In the case of Hiroshima and
5. Anders. Atomare Drohung, p. 199.
6. Günther Anders (1988). Wir Eichmannsöhne. Offener Brief an Klaus Eichmann. München:
Beck, p. 19.
7. Anders. Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen I, p. 291.
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Nagasaki, on the other hand, in a matter of a second the pilots exterminated
hundreds of thousands of people with whom they had absolutely no connec-
tions, literally at the emotionless touch of a button. But what does this mean?
If a man can exterminate millions of his fellow men in a fraction of a second,
a couple of thousand SS soldiers who could only murder millions peu à peu are
harmless by comparison. (…) Whereas nuclear weapons are «apocalyptic» in
the most literal sense of the word, the concentration camps were «apocalyp-
tic» only in a metaphorical sense. Compared to modern means of mass mur-
der, what happened at the extermination camps in the three years prior to
Hiroshima was (and I can hardly write the word) harmless. Compared to the
technical standard and possible capacity of a modern rocket base, the tech-
nology and the output of the concentration camp system were still unwieldy
and 19th-century. … There can be no question: The «future» belongs to mod-
ern mass murder (to the extent that an appliance that produces «futureless-
ness» can be considered to have a future). Naturally this does not preclude the
possibility that Auschwitz may still be regarded as a model for a long time to
come in countries that are not highly industrialized. Those powers that are
not yet in a position to create Hiroshimas will have to make do with the estab-
lishment of «Auschwitzes». But even the Auschwitz principle still has a future
because «the future has not yet begun» everywhere. These two methods of
genocide —the modern one and the less modern one— will continue to «over-
lap» for a long time, indeed for as long as we are even permitted to survive.8
The «Auschwitz principle»: it is not by chance that Anders uses this for-
mulation. This is also the expression of his attempt to find a term between
the apotheosis of the absoluteness of Auschwitz and its trivialization and rel-
ativization. This term was intended to make it possible to understand this his-
torical mass murder as an event that was not subject to pathology or demonism,
but a principle. Under the conditions of the modern age, this principle cannot
become invalid. Though its effectiveness may be surpassed by the advanced
technology of nuclear weapons, it may be diminished in its moral monstros-
ity. According to Anders, the dropping of the atom bombs did not in the least
mean the dawn of a new, irrevocably final era in the history of mankind.
A new age began on August 6, 1945: the age in which we are able at any
moment to transform any location, in fact the entire planet, into a Hiroshi-
ma. Ever since this day we have become modo negativo almighty. However,
since we can now be exterminated at any moment, this also means that since
this day we have become totally powerless. No matter how long it takes, even
if it lasts an eternity, this age will be the last. This is because its differentia
spezifica —the possibility of our self-extermination— can never end, unless
it be through this end itself.9
8. Günther Anders (1979). Besuch im Hades. München: Beck, p. 206 and 207.
9. Anders. Die atomare Drohung, p. 93.
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With all the differences between Auschwitz and Hiroshima, there is an
important subliminal connection based on the trend towards a universal mech-
anization. According to Anders, on the day when the «chiliastic realm of tech-
nical totalitarianism» comes about, «we shall then exist only as parts of machin-
ery, or as parts of the material required by the machine: as humans, we shall
therefore have been liquidated»10. And it is precisely in this respect that the
similarity between this impending techno-totalitarian realm and the mon-
strous one of yesteryear lies. It lies in the total and smooth functionalization
of man, in his incorporation into a system of constraints which he is not even
capable of recognizing as such because it no longer admits a point from which
it could be seen differently, and in the degradation of man to matter, to a raw
material. And it is precisely in this sense that the Eichmann problem is as lit-
tle yesterday’s problem to Anders as the nuclear threat. This does not simply
cease with the end of the Cold War. Although this may increase the chances that
the term given to mankind may be extended, it is inherent in the nature of
monstrosity that it is also present as an idea, even developing a specific poten-
cy as a result. We shall always know that it is technically possible to eliminate
all human life on this planet.
Günther Anders’ first wife, Hannah Arendt, was also to take an interest
in the catastrophes of this century, however with a different focus. Arendt
was born in Hanover in 1906. Soon after her birth, her parents moved to
Königsberg, where she later studied philosophy, theology and Greek in Freiburg
with Husserl, but primarily in Marburg with Heidegger, whose lover she
became. Later she admitted that she had married Günther Anders more out
of disappointment in her unfulfilling affair with Heidegger than out of love
—and after the war she resumed her relationship with Heidegger, albeit in a
different form, and although she knew of Heidegger’s involvement in Nation-
al Socialism11. For her doctorate, Arendt wrote a dissertation on Saint Augus-
tine under Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), with whom she remained friends for
the rest of her life. Between 1930 and 1938 she worked on a study about
Rahel Varnhagen, she was fascinated by the Life of a Jewess. However, the
political situation made it impossible for her to carry on her research work.
Arrested by the Gestapo in 1933, Arendt fled to Paris, and later to the USA.
In 1937 her marriage to Anders was terminated by correspondence, and a
short time later she married Heinrich Blücher. Arendt stayed in the USA,
working extensively on the story of the Jews and anti-Semitism, became polit-
ically involved with the problems of the Jews in Palestine, assuming a rather
anti-Zionist stance. In theory, immediately after the Second World War she
was working on a major study on the phenomenon of totalitarianism. Per-
haps her most important book was published in 1958: The Human Condi-
tion (Vita activa or Vom tätigen Leben). In 1961 she was sent to Jerusalem by
10. Anders. Wir Eichmannsöhne, p. 53.
11. Ettinger, Elzbieta (1995). Hannah Arendt und Martin Heidegger. Eine Geschichte. Mün-
chen: Piper.
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the New Yorker magazine to follow the trial of Adolf Eichmann. The reports
she generated as a result, which also appeared as a book entitled Eichmann
in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil, stirred up considerable contro-
versy. Arendt lectured at various American universities, especially Chicago
and New York. She was awarded numerous prizes, both European and Ger-
man, and died in New York in 1975.
It is worth briefly outlining three aspects of the extensive oeuvre of Han-
nah Arendt that overlap to some extent with the analyses of Günther Anders,
although the tenor of Arendt’s works differs greatly from that of her former
husband. A key document from her political thought is without a doubt her
major study on totalitarianism. Elements and Origins of Total Domination is
the title of a lengthy book that Arendt revised several times. In this book, she
set out to conduct a political, philosophical and historical analysis of the phe-
nomenon of the two major totalitarian systems that the twentieth century has
produced: National Socialism and Stalinism. It is perhaps only now, since
1989, that we can truly see the validity of this study. Arendt adopted the
approach —much criticized at the time— of examining one aspect of Nation-
al Socialism and Stalinism, that of total rule. This did not mean equating these
two systems, but stressing similar structures, methods and goals. According
to Arendt, total rule differs greatly from other forms of absolute rule and is also
not the same as other historical dictatorships. The totalitarian aspect of these
concepts is revealed in the fact that they are all-encompassing in the truest
sense of the term. They are often supported not, as is often assumed, by a party
or a leader, but by the masses:
Totalitarian movements are mass movements and are, to this day, the only
form of organization that modern masses have found and that seems adequate
to them. In this alone they differ from all parties, which are either interest
groups or ideological parties representing the politics of the classes in the nation
state or, in the two-party system of Anglo-Saxon countries, representing citi-
zens who hold a particular view and have a common interest in the handling
of public affairs. In contrast to parties whose power depends on their relative
strength based on numbers in the relevant country, so that we can also talk
about strong parties in small countries, a movement can only exist if it encom-
passes millions of people, and it cannot occur in countries with relatively small
populations, even under the most favorable conditions.12
With this definition, Arendt addresses a key problem in the analysis of
totalitarian systems: that the matter at issue is no longer a classical relation-
ship between ruler and ruled. What is totalitarian about the system is that it is
a mass movement: it is the masses who sustain such movements. The totali-
tarian system is not merely imposed by an exterior force, in some situations
this strong stimulus comes from the modern masses themselves, which in fact
12. Arendt, Hannah (1996). Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft. Antisemitismus, Impe-
rialismus, totale Herrschaft. München: Piper, p. 663.
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only came into being with industrial society. Totalitarian means all embrac-
ing. Other forms of tyrannical or dictatorial rule always relate only to certain
aspects or groups of people. The goal is to extort money or to recruit soldiers.
However, there have always been areas of life that were not of interest to the dic-
tators and tyrants of history. Total dominion takes a different tack. It sets out
to force everyone into its system, with the exception of those who are declared
its enemies, and who must be destroyed. It is for this reason that the universal
mobilization of society by means of a series of associations, societies, groups
and organizations is a key feature of totalitarian systems. The purpose of such
institutions is in fact to integrate the individual in several ways into the sys-
tem of total rule.
Incidentally, this also explains the alarming speed with which the Nazis
succeeded in organizing millions of people and forcing their will upon them.
It was one of the basic prerequisites of this system that each individual should
belong to one of the many organizations, to the Hitler Youth, the League of
German Girls (BDM), the German Work Service, to a paramilitary organi-
zation such as the SA, a military organization, one of the various associations
of college instructors, artists, etc. This also meant being part of a «national
community» on the one hand, and at the same time frequently performing
a management function. No one was merely an underling; everyone was part
of the movement. The line between ruler and ruled then became blurred.
Pre-modern power structures allowed the underling at least to know where
the power was, he could submit to the power, perhaps rebel a little, but qui-
etly, and he even had the possibility of being left in peace. In a totalitarian
system, such peace no longer exists. Everyone is constantly on the move, first
on the streets, then on the battlefield. Just by doing nothing, the individual
becomes the enemy in a totalitarian system; he does not even need to offer
heroic resistance, it suffices for him to refuse to go along with the general
mobilization. Totalitarian systems do all they can to exclude the possibility
of people being passive.
Hannah Arendt analyses this phenomenon of total penetration and all-
encompassing organization of the masses in Stalinism too, to the extent that the
materials were available to her, and she comes to a similar conclusion, even
thought the aspect of the human extermination in the Soviet Union had other
motives and took on a different form from Hitler’s Germany. In the proceed-
ings against Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt saw at first hand how
total power was in fact exercised. Eichmann was the Austrian who had organized
the transportation of Jews to the extermination camps, who disappeared in
South America after the war, was tracked down by the Israeli secret service,
captured and taken to Israel, where he was put on trial. He was condemned
to death and hanged. Arendt followed every detail of the trial, alert, meticulous,
from the word go skeptical of the intent of trial. She realized that Eichmann was
by no means the sadistic monster that the media of the day had depicted, but
rather the archetype of an unsophisticated, intellectually rather monotonous civil
servant who had enjoyed having a successful career and who had basically acted
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out of a desire to do his duty rather than being driven by any ideological con-
viction. Arendt tried to explain this phenomenon whereby someone who was
essentially unimportant and who was merely adapting to his situation could
commit horrendous crimes in the milieu created by totalitarian rule as the
banality of evil, an expression since extensively quoted. In her reflections on
the trial, Hannah Arendt also tried to understand the nature of the crime of
which Eichmann was accused; Arendt insists that it was not, as literature since
the Nuremberg Trials has suggested, a crime against humanity, but rather crimes
against mankind, which would indicate a quite different nature:
Neither the national crime of legalized discrimination nor the international
crime of expulsion were truly new or without previous models, not even in
modern times. Legal discrimination was common practice in the Balkans, and
mass expulsions have been a consequence of all the revolutions of the twenti-
eth century. It was not until the Nazi regime declared that the German nation
would no longer tolerate Jews in Germany, but was intending to wipe the
entire Jewish nation from the face of the earth that a new crime surfaced:
a crime against mankind in the true sense of the word, namely a crime against
the «status of being a human» or the nature of the human race. Expulsion and
genocide are both international crimes, but a distinction must be drawn between
them; expulsion violates the regional sovereignty of neighboring countries,
whereas genocide is an attack on human diversity as such, i.e. on one of the
essential characteristics of being human, without our even having to truly
understand such things as mankind or the human race.
According to Arendt, the extermination of European Jews by the Nazis
then takes on two dimensions. On the one hand, it was an attack on the Jews
as Jews; on the other, it was an attack on the idea of mankind itself:
If the court in Jerusalem had understood that discrimination, expulsion and
genocide are not simply the same thing, then it would immediately have been
clear that the greatest crime facing it, namely the physical eradication of the Jew-
ish people, was a crime against mankind, carried out against the Jewish people,
and that only the choice of the victim and not the nature of the crime could
be derived from the long history of hatred of the Jews and anti-Semitism.13
Throughout her life, Hannah Arendt was concerned with the question of
what it means to be human. The most comprehensive and also the most impres-
sive discussion of this topic can be found in her study Vita activa or Active
Life. In the final analysis, this study is about the question of how the behavior
of humans has evolved over the course of history. Arendt refers to Aristotle
and makes the following distinction between human activities: «The expression
vita activa is used here to describe three basic human activities: labor, work
and action»14. In contrast to the currently popular view, action is not tanta-
13. Arendt, Hannah (1996). Eichmann in Jerusalem. Ein Bericht von der Banalität des Bösen.
München: Piper, p. 391 and 392.
14. Arendt, Hannah (1981). Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben. München: Piper, p. 14.
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mount to labor. Labor is dealing with nature as a necessity of life, typically left
to slaves in classical antiquity. In the thinking of those days, labor was not an
action worthy of a free man. It must be kept distinct from work, which is more
than and different from labor. Work means undertaking a creative act, want-
ing to create something artistic that already existed as an idea and that was
potentially intended to outlast its creator. Work was anything from the crafts-
man who produces articles ranging from pure usurpation and processing of
nature to the artist who creates immortal works. The Greek work for labor,
poiesis, is retained in our word poetry. Classical antiquity also had the concept
of action, which was described as practice: social and political communication
between humans, intended to give some form to coexistence, i.e., politics in the
true sense of the word. In classical antiquity, active people could only be con-
ceived of as free men, subject to neither internal nor external pressures. How-
ever, classical antiquity also had a counterpart to these three forms of active
live: theoretical life, or vita contemplativa. The maxim of this form of existence
was not activity, but the employment of the intellect, requiring that the body
be inactive. For Aristotle this was the true life ideal, as the philosopher should
lead a life of contemplation.
This central thesis of Hannah Arendt’s —and in this she is closely aligned
with Günther Anders— states that modern times have successively eliminat-
ed all these life forms, with one exception. That exception is work. All the
other forms have either been discredited, like the vita contemplativa, or they
have been turned into types of work. Today, everyone works, from the politi-
cian and the artist to the sportsman. The concept of work has become so uni-
versal that we no longer love but, carry out relationship work. The idea behind
this is that only what is efficient and measurable is socially acceptable. Hannah
Arendt recognized this trend early on and registered her concern:
If we compare the modern world with worlds we know from the past, what
we notice above all else is the enormous decline in experience inherent in this
development. It is not just that cursory contemplation no longer has a place in
the range of specifically human, rational experience; even thinking, where it
involves drawing conclusions, has been degraded to a function of the brain
that electronic computers can perform significantly better, faster and more
efficiently than the human brain. Action on the other hand, which is now
equated with work, is declining to the level of labor, because even work
—due to its inherent worldliness and indifference to the demands of life—
can be tolerated only as a form of labor, as a perhaps more complex function
of the life process that is essentially indistinguishable from other functions.15
However, even labour itself is losing the status it had acquired at least in a
bourgeois age. Labor is ceasing to be a satisfying momentum in the self-affir-
mation of being human:
15. Arendt. Vita activa, p. 314.
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But even this world, focused solely on labor, is gradually giving way to anoth-
er world. We have succeeded in eliminating the effort and toil inherent in the
learning process to such an extent that we can foresee the time when labor
and the life experience it brings will be eliminated from the human experi-
ence. There are already indications of this in the most advanced countries of
the world, where the word labor is already too sophisticated for what people do
or believe they are doing. In its final stages the labor society is transformed
into a society of job-holders; this society demands little more from those who
are part of it little more than automatic functioning, as if the life of the indi-
vidual had already become completely submerged in the flow of vital process-
es of which the species is master, and as if the only active, individual decision
consisted only of letting go, as it were, giving up one’s individuality, or dead-
ening the senses that register the toil and anguish of life in order to be able to
«function» better and more smoothly in a completely «calm» state.16
It is hard not to admit that there is a certain farsightedness and plausibil-
ity in this analysis. The hope proffered by late industrial society for this deval-
uation of individual activity lies solely in productivity promising the individ-
ual previously unsuspected freedom, in which the possibilities of action, work
and contemplation destroyed by the process of modernization could be regained.
However, it remains to be seen whether this would be in the interests of the
leisure industry. At the close of this century, it is in fact not inconceivable that
—as Günther Anders believed— man has become an antiquated creature. The
philosophical reassurance of all that being a human could mean is undoubtedly
not the way to regain what has been lost; but it is perhaps a necessary pre-
condition for everything being done at least to prevent the worst excesses
of a dehumanized human condition in the future.
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